AI agent glossary

The terms that come up when AI agents get access to company data, tools and each other — from MCP and A2A to tool poisoning and chain tokens — each defined in a sentence or two, with a link to the answer that goes deeper.

A2A (Agent2Agent protocol)

Also: Agent2Agent, agent-to-agent protocol

An open protocol for AI agents to discover each other and delegate tasks: one agent sends another a message, the other works on it as a task and returns the result.
MCP vs A2A →
Agent Card
The A2A description an agent publishes about itself: its name, skills, endpoint and how callers must authenticate. Callers read it to decide whether and how to delegate.
Securing agent-to-agent communication →
Agent loop

Also: runaway agent

Agents calling each other, or the same tool, over and over without making progress. Stopped with limits on chain depth, repeated identical requests, fan-out, call count and cost.
Stop AI agent loops →
Agent mesh
A broker that every agent-to-agent and agent-to-tool call passes through, so one set of rules decides which agent may call which, what data may cross, and records every hop.
DBShifts Agent Mesh →
Agentic AI

Also: AI agents

AI systems that pursue a goal by taking actions — calling tools, reading data, delegating to other agents — rather than only answering one prompt.
AI agent security best practices →
AI agent gateway
A control point between AI agents and the data they read. Each agent gets a scoped token instead of credentials, and every request is checked against policy and recorded before data is returned.
What is an AI agent gateway? →
AI data governance
The rules, controls and records that decide which data AI systems may use, for what, and that prove afterwards what they actually used.
What is AI data governance? →
Audit trail (for AI agents)
A record of every request an agent made — who, when, what was asked, what was returned or refused — kept so access can be reviewed and proven later.
Audit what data an AI agent accessed →
Chain token

Also: delegation token

A signed token passed along a chain of agent calls that names who started the chain and every agent since, so each hop can apply the original requester's permissions and the path cannot be forged.
Trace multi-agent workflows →
Data masking (for AI)

Also: PII masking, redaction

Replacing sensitive values — emails, card numbers, ID numbers — with placeholders on the server, before the data reaches a model.
Stop AI agents seeing customer PII →
Default deny
A policy stance where nothing is allowed unless a rule allows it: an agent reaches a table, tool or other agent only by explicit permission.
Least-privilege permissions for AI agents →
DLP for AI

Also: AI data loss prevention

Keeping personal data, secrets and regulated fields out of model context, by minimising, masking and blocking them in the data path rather than detecting leaks afterwards.
Stop sensitive data leaking to LLMs →
Human-in-the-loop

Also: HITL, human approval

A control where an agent proposes an action with consequences and a person approves or rejects it before it runs.
Human approval for AI agent actions →
Indirect prompt injection
Instructions planted in content an AI agent reads — a database row, a web page, a document, a tool result — that the model follows as if they came from the user.
Prompt injection hidden in database data →
Kill switch (AI agent)
A control that stops one agent's access immediately, on its next request, without changing any other agent.
Stop a misbehaving AI agent →
Least privilege (for AI agents)
Giving each agent only the tables, columns, tools and agents its task needs, and no more, so a mistake or an injected instruction can do little harm.
Least-privilege permissions for AI agents →
MCP (Model Context Protocol)

Also: Model Context Protocol

An open standard for connecting AI applications to tools and data. An MCP client in the AI app talks to MCP servers, which expose tools, resources and prompts.
What is MCP? →
MCP client
The part of an AI application — Claude Desktop, an editor, an agent framework — that connects to MCP servers, lists their tools and calls them on the model's behalf.
Connect Claude Desktop to a database over MCP →
MCP gateway
A proxy between AI agents and MCP servers that decides which tools each agent may call with which arguments, scans descriptions and results, and records every call.
What is an MCP gateway? →
MCP server
A program that exposes tools, resources and prompts over the Model Context Protocol, so any MCP-capable AI application can discover and use them.
Is an MCP server safe for your database? →
MCP tool
An action an MCP server offers, described by a name, a description the model reads, and a schema for its arguments. The model decides when to call it.
Control which MCP tools an agent can call →
OAuth for MCP
The way remote MCP servers authorize clients: OAuth 2.1 with PKCE, so a person signs in from their MCP client and the server knows who each request is for.
MCP authentication: OAuth for AI agents →
Prompt injection
Text that tries to override an AI model's instructions. Direct injection comes from the user; indirect injection is planted in content the model reads.
Prompt injection hidden in database data →
RAG (retrieval-augmented generation)
Answering a question by first retrieving relevant documents or rows and giving them to the model, instead of relying only on what the model learned in training.
RAG vs direct database access →
Rug pull (MCP)
An MCP tool whose description changes after it was reviewed and approved, so it starts instructing the model differently without anyone re-approving it.
MCP tool poisoning →
Scoped token
A credential issued to one agent that allows only specific actions on specific data, and can be revoked without affecting anyone else.
Give AI agents database access safely →
Text-to-SQL
Turning a plain-English question into a SQL query with a language model. Safe on production only when the generated query runs under strict limits and permissions.
Is text-to-SQL safe on production data? →
Tool poisoning
Hiding instructions for the model in a tool's description or metadata, so the model leaks data or misuses tools when it reads the tool list.
MCP tool poisoning →
Zero trust for AI agents
Treating no agent as trusted because of where it runs: every request is authorized on its own, by default deny, with short-lived tokens and everything the agent reads treated as hostile.
Zero trust for AI agents →

Govern your agents, their tools and their data

An AI agent gateway for databases and an agent mesh for A2A and MCP calls.